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I. SECTION 16(b): INSIDER TRADING
Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act), the common law provided few remedies for the abuses aris-
ing from speculative trading in securities by officers, directors, and
substantial shareholders.283  Courts in various jurisdictions relied on
one of three theories to provide relief from insider speculative prac-
tices. First, the majority of courts followed the theory that offi-
cers and directors owed no fiduciary duty to stockholders and that
an insider would incur liability only if he actively perpetrated a
fraud.28 4 Secondly, a few courts followed the theory that officers
and directors did owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders, and thus
these insiders had a duty to disclose all material facts affecting the
value of shares.28 5  Finally, some courts followed the "special circum-
stances" theory, first announced in Strong v. Repide,210 in which
officers and directors were held not to owe a fiduciary duty to stock-
holders unless special facts made it inequitable for the insider to take
advantage of the stockholders. 8 7 In addition, certain substantial share-
holders were held to owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders
where the substantial shareholder held a position of influence over cor-
283. For an excellent discussion of the common law approach to insider trading, see
Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133, 139-43 (1939). See also Heli-Coil
Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1965); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Cook & Feldman, Insider
Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385, 408-10 (1953);
Note, Section 16(b): Re-evaluation is Needed, 25 U. MIAmI L. Rav. 144, 145-46 (1970).
284. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Carpenter v. Dan-
forth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525 (1873);
Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 87 (1874); Voellmack v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6
P.2d 373 (1931). See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
285. See, e.g., Steinfield v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 P. 879 (1914); Oliver v. Oliver,
118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); cf. Perry v. Pearson, 135 IM. 218, 25 N.E. 636 (1890).
See generally A. BERLE, Sirums IN Tim LAw oF CORPOATON FINANCE 176-88 (1928).
286. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
287. In more recent cases, a few state courts have held that inside information is a
corporate asset and that misuse of this information by a director is a breach of the di-
rector's fiduciary duty to the corporation. Under this theory, the remedy granted to the
corporation is in the form of a constructive trust. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co.,
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285,
287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
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porate management.2a8
Both because the majority of courts held that officers, directors, and
substantial shareholders owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders in
general, and because the elements of insider liability were often too
difficult for injured shareholders to establish, the common law remedies
proved to be an inadequate deterrent to abusive insider trading.289
Frequent reports of the misuse of inside information dramatically
demonstrated to Congress the remedial impotence of the common
law.290  This impotence was viewed by Congress as allowing the con-
tinued injury of the specific shareholders involved 291 and as causing
an improper influence on the securities markets in general.
2 92
288. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). Contra,
Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, Inc., 178 Ore. 161, 165 P.2d 779 (1946). These cases arose
in the area of stockholder voting and directors' actions when the board was controlled
by the majority shareholder. The majority shareholder was held to owe a fiduciary duty
to minority shareholders.
289. See Hearings on S. Res. Nos. 84, 56 & 97 Before the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Comm., 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934); Note, American Stand-
ard, Inc. v. Crane Co.: The Insufficiency of Section 16(b), 22 BuFFALO L. REv. 889
(1973).
The original drafts of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Act], 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), which barred only the improper use
of insider information, were discarded because of the difficulty of proving the impro-
priety. See H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
Other early drafts made it unlawful for any director, officer, or substantial shareholder
to engage in short-swing trading. See Hearings, supra at 6430, 6955. These drafts were
rejected as being overbroad. The final draft of § 16(b) sought to ease the overbroad-
ness while at the same time avoiding the difficulties of proof inherent in the common
law actions. See H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
290. For a list of abuses reported to Congress, see H.R. REP. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. Nos. 792, 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
291. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 428 n.2 (1972);
Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d
426 (2d Cir. 1954); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952); Gratz v. Claugh-
ton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Colby v. Klune, 178
F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 907 (1949); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 761 (1947); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal.
1953); Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1951); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
292. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v. Ogsbury,
210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952); Gratz
v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Colby v. Klune,
178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 907 (1949); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282
873
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/3
874 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
In reaction to this situation, Congress approached the problem of
protecting shareholders through two different avenues: first, in section
10(b) 293 of the 1934 Act, by imposing on every buyer and seller of
securities a duty to disclose material information;294 and second, in sec-
tion 16(b)295 of the Act, by providing that insiders20 of any company
(S.D. Cal. 1953); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
293. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Although the SEC has promulgated sixteen rules
under the authority granted to it in § 10(b), SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1974), is the most important in the present discussion. For a discussion of certain
aspects of the rule, see part V infra.
294. Although § 10(b) and SEC rule 10b-5 do not explicitly provide for a private
cause of action, it is now established that such a right is implied by the statute. See
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.6 (1971); 6 L.
Loss, SEcunITE REGLU. TioN 3869-73 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Loss]; cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964).
295. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The section provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously
contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such
profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit
within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same
thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date
such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may
exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
The section was held constitutional in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
296. Statutory insiders include "directors," "officers," and "beneficial owners" of the
issuer. The term "director" is defined in § 3(a)(7) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780
(a) (7) (1970), as "any director of a corporation or any person performing similar func-
tions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." The
term "officer" is defined in rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1974), as "a president, vice
president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an
issuer ... functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing." The term
"beneficial owner" is defined in § 16(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970),Washington University Open Scholarship
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were liable to the company2 97 for profits realized from any purchase
and sale 298 or sale and purchase of the company's equity securities2 99
within a period of six months."'0
While the general antifraud provisions of section 10(b) were meant
to encompass all transactions in securities, the provisions of section
16(b) were aimed specifically at remedying the abuses arising from
speculative trading by insiders.30' Considered broadly remedial, 302
a "[e]very person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which
is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title .... " See Elerin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
297. This is basically a form of constructive trust. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d
840 (2d Cir. 1959); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Blau v. Oppenheim,
250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); Cook & Feldman, supra note 283.
298. The term "purchase" is defined in § 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(13) (1970), to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire."
The term "sale" is defined in § 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14)
(1970), to include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." See notes 366-88 infra
and accompanying text.
299. The term "equity security" is defined in § 3(a) (11) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
I 78c(a)(l1) (1970), as
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or without con-
sideration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase such a security, or any such warrant or right; or any other se-
curity which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider
necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in
the public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity se-
curity.
See notes 317-22 infra and accompanying text.
300. See notes 361-65 infra and accompanying text. Section 16(b) provides that an
action may be brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation. See Blau v. Op-
penheim, 250 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Cook & Feldman, supra note 283; Yourd,
supra note 283.
301. See 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (preamble); Cook & Feld-
man, supra note 283; Yourd, supra note 283; Note, supra note 283; 72 COLUM. L. REv.
1090 (1972); 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1973). See also Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507,
515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140,
142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720
Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 85
(1934); Hearings, supra note 289, at 6557-59.
302. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959); Gadsby & Treadway,
Recent Developments Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
N.Y.L.F. 687 (1971); Laufer, Effect of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
on Use of Options by Insiders, 8 N.Y.L.F. 232 (1962); Note, supra note 283; 26
S.W.LJ. 792 (1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/3
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section 16(b) was termed a "crude rule of thumb"308 because liability
was based on proof of objective factors and not on proof of intent or
actual misuse of inside information.80 4 The statute's ease of application
was meant to serve as a clear guide to insiders' conduct,30'° and the sta-
tute's overbreadth was thought to be alleviated by the six-month limita-
tion 306 and the SEC's exemption power.30 7
Early judicial interpretations emphasized the objective nature of
section 16(b) while deemphasizing the harshness that might arise
from application of the statute to transactions or persons not meant to
be covered by the Act. In Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte"8 the
Second Circuit determined that the otherwise "unorthodox trans-
action 8 09 of a conversion of preferred into common stock was a
"purchase" simply because by the conversion the holder "acquired"
303. Hearings, supra note 289, at 6557 (statement of Thomas Corcoran). See also
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 350 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (34. Cir. 1965); Booth v. Varian Associates,
334 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Rheem Mfg. Co. v.
Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961).
304. The "irrespective of any intention on the part of such [insider]" language of
§ 16(b) makes this clear. See Hearings, supra note 289, at 6557 (statement of Thomas
Corcoran). See also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532
(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966);
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959); Alloys Unltd., Inc. v. Gilbert, 319
F. Supp. 617, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
305. H.R. RuP. No. 1387, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934); see Bershad v. MeDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966);
Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1961); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1959); Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Jefferson Lake
Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 25 (E.D. La. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
306. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Ber-
shad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
307. Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
308. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
309. The term "unorthodox transaction" refers to the disposition or receipt of securi-
ties in a manner not ordinarily considered a purchase or sale. 2 Loss 1066-70.Washington University Ope  Scholarship
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stock within the meaning of section 3(a)(13)31 0 of the 1934 Act.
In another decision, the same court reasoned that the preamble
to section 16(b) did not make the standard of liability subjective,
but rather was intended to guide the SEC in performing its rule-making
function and the courts in determining the statute's constitutionality. 11
If the statute's application to a particular situation was considered harsh,
the Third Circuit in Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster3" 2 thought that such
harshness was to be alleviated through the Commission's rule-making
powers and not by the courts.313
The vast majority of courts, however, rejected these contentions and
adopted a "subjective" or "pragmatic" approach 14 which limited sec-
tion 16(b) liability in unorthodox cases to those transactions that "may
serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to prevent."31 5 Un-
der this subjective approach, the statute is applied only when its use
would serve its goals, because "where alternative constructions of the
terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construc-
tion that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing
speculation by corporate insiders."' 6  Although this approach has
been used most often in determining whether a particular transaction
is a "purchase" or "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b), it has
also been used to determine whether the statute's substantive elements
apply in borderline situations.
A. The Substantive Elements of Section 16(b)
Various tests are used by the courts to determine whether the
substantive elements of section 16(b) liability exist within the particu-
310. 160 F.2d at 987.
311. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
312. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
313. Id. at 165. Contra, Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 254 (S.D.
N.Y. 1959).
314. This approach is considered "subjective" or "pragmatic" because the courts ap-
ply the statutory terms only in those situations meant to be covered by the Act. In
this manner, the alleged harsh results caused by overbroad definitions of statutory terms
are alleviated.
315. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594
(1973).
316. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972).
Vol. 1974:815] 877
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lar fact situation presented by a case. These statutory elements include
"equity security," "beneficial owner," "director," "officer," "less than
six months," "purchase" and "sale," and "profit."
1. "Equity Security"
Except for the limitations that the "equity security" must be a non-
exempt security and that it must be registered pursuant to section 12
of the 1934 Act,3 17 the term "equity security" has been defined broadly
to include stock, similar securities whether or not issued by a corpora-
tion, securities convertible into stock or similar securities, and warrants
and rights.""' As a result of this broad definition, most courts have as-
sumed, without discussion, that the security with which they were deal-
ing was an "equity security." '319
Two collateral issues develop from the use of the term "equity securi-
ty" in section 16(b). First, since the convertible security and the under-
lying stock into which it is convertible are both "equity securities," a
problem arises when the receipt of -the convertible security, the conver-
sion into stock, and the subsequent sale of the stock all occur within
a six-month period. Assuming -that the transactions involved are all
either "purchases" or "sales," it is questionable whether Congress
meant the convertible security to be an "equity security" separate and
distinct from the underlying stock into which it is converted. To define
each security as an "equity security" would impose a hardship on the
statutory insider.32 0  This anomaly prompted the Commission to enact
rule 16b-9 which exempts "[a]ny acquisition or disposition of an
equity security involved in the conversion of an equity security which
. . . is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into an-
other equity security of the same issuer .... ,,321
317. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970). The limitations are contained, respectively, in §§ 16
(b) and (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), (a) (1970).
318. See 1934 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970); SEC rule 3all-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1974).
319. For cases specifically applying § 3(a)(11), see Bershad v. McDonough, 428
F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (option); Chemical
Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967) (convertible debenture);
Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962) (puts and calls); Shaw v. Drey-
fus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (warrants); Jeffer-
son Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20, 23 (E.D. La. 1952), affd, 202 F.2d
433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (treasury stock).
320. The hardship results because the conversion would then be considered both a
"sale" of the convertible security and a "purchase" of the underlying security.
321. 17 C.F.R, § 240.16b-9 (1974).Washington University Open Scholarship
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Secondly, section 16(b) defines liability in terms of the purchase and
sale of "any equity security." A literal application of this requirement
would hold an insider liable to the corporation for a purchase of stock
and a subsequent sale of unrelated convertible debentures within a six-
month period. Again, this would cause an anomalous result. For this
reason, the courts require that the two transactions involve the same
or related securities.322
2. Statutory Insiders
a. "Beneficial Owner"
The phrase "beneficial owner" in section 16(b) refers to sec-
tion 16(a), which defines "beneficial owner" to include "[e]very
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security . . ".3. In
Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.32 4 the Second
Circuit held that each "series" of an issue of preferred stock was not
a separate "class" for purposes of determining a beneficial owner's in-
sider status."-' The court reached its decision by rejecting the use
of the subjective approach as a guide to what is meant by an "insider,"
and instead defined the term "class" according to "the common usage
of the day in the legal and financial worlds. 13 20
In determining whether a person beneficially owns more than ten
percent of any class of any equity security, courts regard the class as
consisting of all outstanding, nonexempt, registered equity securities
of that class, "exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for
the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer." 327 In addition,
rule 1 6a-2(b)3 28 provides that a person may be a ten-percent beneficial
owner of a class of convertible equity securities and, simultaneously,
be a ten-percent beneficial owner of the equity security which may be
acquired by exercise of the conversion and similar privileges.329
322. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Yourd, supra note 283, at 147.
323. 1934 Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
324. 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
325. Id. at 262-63.
326. Id. at 261-62.
327. 1934 Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
328. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1974).
329. This is commonly referred to as the "hypothetical conversion" theory. See, e.g.,
Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); American
Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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One of the more difficult problems in defining "beneficial owner"
is determining when a person attains the status of a ten-percent bene-
ficial owner. Section 16(b) by its terms is "not [to] be construed to
cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the
security involved." In Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.330 the
court determined that a person is a ten-percent beneficial owner for
purposes of the transaction which placed him over the ten-percent
mark.331 The Stella court reasoned that since the exemption clause in
section 16(b) was subject to two possible constructions, the construction
that best effectuated the congressional purpose of curbing abusive in-
sider trading should be chosen. 2 The court reasoned that
[i]f the construction urged by defendant [that "at the time" means
"prior to" rather than "simultaneously with"] is placed upon the exemp-
tion provision, it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block
of stock, sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less than 10%,
and then repeat the process, ad infinitum. A construction such as this
would provide a way for the evasion of § 16(b) by principle stockholders
333
This construction of the exemption provision suggests that a person
should also be considered a ten-percent beneficial owner for purposes
of a concluding transaction in which the beneficial owner reduces his
holdings to less than ten percent.134
b. "Director"
Even though the definition of "director" in section 3(a)(7)33 ' of the
1934 Act is broad, no judicial decision has considered the question of
whether a particular person is a "director. ' 336 Rather, the courts have
330. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
331. Id. at 959-60. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). But
see Provident Sec. Inv. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1975). In its determination of Provident, the Supreme
Court will have an opportunity to resolve the uncertainty in this area.
332. 104 F. Supp. at 959.
333. Id.
334. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 283, at 631. But see Reliance Elec. Co. V.
Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
335. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7) (1970). See note 296 supra.
336. The courts, however, have held a person a "director" under a deputization theory.
See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406Washington University Open Scholarship
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dealt with the problem of when a director is a statutory insider for sec-
tion 16(b) purposes. The language of the statutory exemption 37 refers
only to beneficial owners. This distinction was emphasized in Ad-
ler v. Klawans,338 in which the Second Circuit held that a person
is liable under section 16(b) if he was a director at the date of sale
even if he was no longer a director at the date of purchase." 9 The
court reasoned that
[tihe statute itself, independent of its legislative history, seems to treat
directors and officers as one category of "insiders" and 10% beneficial
owners as another. There is, of course, a logical and practical basis for
distinction. Generally, although there are important exceptions, in cer-
tain circumstances, officers and directors have more ready access to the
intimate business secrets of corporations and factors which can affect the
real and ultimately the market value of stock than does even so large
a stockholder as a "10% beneficial owner."3 40
The Adler court avoided deciding whether rule 16a-10, 34 1 in
conjunction with Form 4,342 was a proper exercise of the SEC's power
and found that the reporting rules of section 16(a) extended to a
person who became a director after acquiring the securities. The
same court, however, did reach the issue 343 eleven years later. In
F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Rattner v. Lehman, 193
F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J., concurring); Marquette Mfg. Co. v. Andreas,
239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Under this theory a person or firm is considered
a director if an actual director was acting as an agent for that person or firm.
337. The pertinent language of § 16(b) is:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or
the sale and purchase, of the equity security involved ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
338. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
339. Id. at 845-46. See, e.g., Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569, 571-
72 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also
Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Sentiff, 205 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
340. 267 F.2d at 845.
341. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1974). The rule provides:
Any transaction which has been or shall be exempted from the requirements
of section 16(a) shall, insofar as it is otherwise subject to the provisions of
section 16(b), be likewise exempted from section 16(b).
342. Form 4 is required to be filed by SEC rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1
(1974). Prior to October 20, 1969, however, when subsection (e) of the rule became
effective, rule 16a-1 did not require a director to file Form 4 after his directorship
ceased.
343. The courts have consistently held that they may review the propriety of a rule
adopted by the Commission. See, e.g., Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260,
268 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/3
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Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.344 the court held that a person is
liable under section 16(b) if he was a director at the time of purchase,
even though he had resigned and was no longer a director at the time
of sale. The court dealt with the Commission's exemption by stating:
To be sure, the congressional belief that inside information could be
abused . . . is just as germane to the situation when a person is a di-
rector only at the time of purchase as when he is a director only
at the time of the sale. For, in the case of a director who resigns his
directorship before the sale it is possible for both the purchase and sale
to have been unfairly motivated by insider knowledge; whereas if the
purchase were made prior to the directorship only the sale could be mo-
tivated by inside information. Clearly, therefore, a "short swing" sale
or purchase by a resigning director must be a transaction "compre-
hended within the purpose of" § 16(b), and to the extent [the Rule] ex-
empts such a transaction from § 16(b) the Rule is invalid. 345
c. "Officer"
Because the status of directors and officers is treated similarly for
purposes of section 16(b), the applicable law of the timing of a direc-
tor's status also applies to officers. 340 Thus, the courts have stated that
a person need only be an officer at the time of either the purchase or
sale to be liable under section 16(b).
There is, however, some dispute as to who is an officer for purposes
of section 16(b). Rule 3b-2347 defines "officer" as "a president,
vice president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person
who performs for an issuer . . . functions corresponding to those per-
formed by the foregoing officers." The Second Circuit has rejected
a "constitutional" definition 348 of rule 3b-2. Instead, in Colby v.
692-93 (2d Cir. 1957); Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). In fact, the courts have reviewed the propriety of a variety of rules. See, e.g.,
Kornfield v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1964) (rule 16b-6); Colby v. Klune, 178
F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949) (rule 3b-2); Volk v. Zlotoff, 318 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(rule 16b-6); Perlman v. Timberlake, supra (rule 16b-3); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (rule 3b-2); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (same); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (rule 16b-6).
344. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
345. Id. at 268.
346. See Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Cook & Feldman, supra
note 283, at 632.
347. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1974).
348. The "constitutional definition" provides that a person would be an officer only
when he is so designated by the corporation's by-laws.Washington University Open Scholarship
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Klune, 49 that court defined "officer" in light of the purposes of section
16(b), stating:
[W]e construe "officer" . thus: It includes .. . a corporate em-
ployee performing important executive duties of such character that he
would be likely, in discharging these duties, to obtain confidential infor-
mation about the company's affairs that would aid him if he engaged
in personal market transactions. It is immaterial how his functions are
labelled or how defined in the by-laws, or that he does or does not act
under the supervision of some other corporate representative ...
• ..Under that Rule as we interpet it, it does not matter whether or
how the by-laws of this particular company define the duties of such offi-
cers. The question is what this particular employee was called upon to
do in this particular company, i.e., the relation between his authorized
activities and those of this corporation. Again, under this Rule, it is not
decisive whether or not some other person supervised his work.3 0
Three years after this decision, the Second Circuit's "subjective ap-
proach" was specifically repudiated by the District Court for the
Southern District of California in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rath-
man.851 The Rathman court, after finding that rule 3b-2 was valid,
held that an assistant treasurer of Lockheed was not an officer because
he merely assisted the actual treasurer in the performance of his func-
tions, and because Lockheed did not consider him an officer.852 One
year later, in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell,353 the same court
refused to apply either the "subjective" test of Colby or the "objective"
test of Rathman. The Campbell court found, however, that Campbell,
who served both as assistant secretary and assistant treasurer of Lock-
heed, was not an officer simply because he did not perform the func-
tions that the secretary and treasurer of Lockheed performed. 5 4
3. "Less Than Six Months"
In order for an insider to be liable under section 16(b), the purchase
and sale must occur within "any period of less than six months." Al-
though a majority of the courts have assumed that six months is the outer
349. 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
350. Id. at 873, 875 (footnote omitted).
351. 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
352. Id. at 813.
353. 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
354. Id. at 285.
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limit of liability, 5  the statutory language mandates otherwise, and
the Second Circuit has agreed with this literal interpretation. 36
The six-month period represents a balance struck between the need
to deter short-swing speculation and the need to avoid unduly inhibiting
long-term corporate investment.357  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Blau
v. Max Factor & Co. 358 used this statutory policy as a basis for deter-
mining that a particular exchange was not a "sale." The court was con-
cerned with the sale of stock made by family members of a closely held
corporation which had been obtained in an exchange the previous
month. With respect to the purpose behind the six-month period, the
court stated:
Appellees' investment commitment in Max Factor & Co. was a long
term one, undertaken... many years prior to their exchange of Corn-,
mon for Class A. The exchange of Class A for Common did not inter-
rupt the continuity of appellees' investment: it did not increase or de-
crease the amount invested, or alter in any way the risk assumed long
years before. Moreover, since there was no speculative advantage in
holding Class A rather than Common, the exchange conferred no oppor-
tunity for speculative profit which appellees did not already enjoy.
Thus, appellees made only one investment decision in the six months'
period-the decision to terminate their long-term investment by sale.
The exchange was in reality only a step in the process of sale ... . 3
4. "Purchase" and "Sale"
The terms "purchase" and "sale" are broadly defined by the 1934
Act.360 The application of these definitions to particular transactions,
355. See, e.g., B.T. Babbitt; Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964); Adler
v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
356. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 103 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), afl'd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). The court
in Stella stated that "[tio be less than 6 months the statutory period must be 6 months
minus one full period from midnight to midnight since the law does not take into ac-
count fractions of a day." Id. at 104.
357. S. EP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934); see Blau v. Max Factor & Co.,
342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
358. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
359. Id. at 308 (footnote omitted).
360. For the definition of "purchase," see 1934 Act § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(a) (13) (1970). For the definition of "sale," see id. § 3(a) (14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(14) (1970). See note 298 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
SECURITIES REGULATION
therefore, would seem to cause little difficulty. Nonetheless, the oppo-
site has proven true. The courts have had great difficulty deciding
whether a particular transaction is a "purchase!' or "sale" and determin-
ing the exact time a particular "purchase" or "sale" occurred. This dif-
ficulty has arisen because "purchase" and "sale" have a broader defini-
tion in the 1934 Act than in common usage.
Unlike their counterparts in the Securities Act of 1933,361 the defini-
tions of "purchase" and "sale" under the 1934 Act contain no concept
of either volition or receipt of value. The courts, however, have been
quick to attach both of these concepts to the definitions of "purchase"
and "sale" under the 1934 Act. Two cases have held that a bona fide
gift does not constitute a sale because of the absence of a receipt of
value,3 62 and it has been intimated that the receipt or disposal of secu-
rities by devise would not constitute a "purchase" or "sale" for the same
reason.363  Finally, the disposition of shares pursuant to the rescission
of a contract has been held not to constitute a "sale" because there was
an absence of volition.364
Typical transactions involving the voluntary disposition or receipt
of securities for value, therefore, have caused the courts little concern.
Instead, the courts have disagreed about whether "unorthodox" trans-
actions 65 such as mergers,3 66 corporate reorganizations,367 conver-
361. Section 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], 15
U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970), defines "sale" to include "every contract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value." The term "purchase" is not used in
the 1933 Act. Instead, that Act uses the phrase "offer to buy," which is defined in §
2(3 ) to include any disposition of a security "for value."
362. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907
(1949); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950). The Truncale court re-
jected the argument that the tax benefit that arises from a bona fide gift gives the trans-
action value.
363. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1950).
364. Kahausky v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 184 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). See also Alloys Unltd., Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Blau
v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Contra, Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
365. The term "unorthodox transaction" was used initially by Professor Loss. 2
Loss 1066-70.
366. Two cases that have found a "merger" covered by the 1934 Act are Newmark
v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970), and Mar-
quette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Newmark,
RKO General sought to gain control of Central Airlines by making a tender offer to
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sions, s6 stock reclassifications, 39 intracorporate exchanges,1 70 and the
Central's shareholders. Central and Frontier Airlines countered by entering into a de-
fensive merger. At the time the merger agreement was made, RKO owned 56%
of Frontier's common stock. RKO's purchase contracts were executed approximately
two weeks before the exchange pursuant to the merger took place. The court, applying
the subjective, possibility-of-speculative-abuse test, found that the exchange constituted
a "sale" because RKO's relationship to Frontier placed it in a position where it "could
have reaped a speculative profit" from the unfair use of inside information. 425 F.2d
at 353-54 (emphasis original). In Marquette the court, although suggesting that it was
applying the subjective test, held that an exchange pursuant to a merger agreement was
a "purchase" because the transaction resembled an ordinary cash transaction. 239 F.
Supp. at 966.
SEC rule 16b-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-7 (1974), now exempts from § 16(b) mergers in
which 85% of the equity securities of the merged company are owned by the surviving
company. It is interesting to note that SEC rule 145 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. §
230.145 (1974), which became effective on January 1, 1973, makes mergers "sales"
under the 1933 Act for purposes of the prospectus requirement, so long as the merger
agreement is submitted for the vote or consent of the security holders. The submission
requirement was thought to be necessary to meet the judicially imposed requirement that
some element of volition be present. See 1 Loss 512-46 (Supp. 1969). Prior to the
adoption of SEC rule 145, SEC rule 133 provided that a merger was not a "sale." Rule
133 was rescinded because the SEC decided that a merger is a "sale" under § 2(3) of
the 1933 Act. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 18, 1972).
367. In Blan v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), the court, applying
the objective test, held that the exchange of stock in a subsidiary for stock in the parent
was a "purchase" of the stock in the parent. The court stated that the "[dIefendants
did not own the common stock in question before they exercised their option to convert;
they did afterward. Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act."
Id. at 373. See also Provident See. Inv. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1117 (1975) (corporate liquidation subject to
section 16(b) scrutiny).
368. For cases holding that the receipt of shares pursuant to a conversion of a con-
vertible security is a "purchase," see Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir.
1965) (applying objective test); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (same). For cases holding that the receipt of shares
pursuant to a conversion of a convertible security is not a "purchase," see Petteys v. But-
ler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (applying subjec-
tive test); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967) (same); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959) (same); Lynan v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104 (D. Del. 1967) (same).
Although the exact holdings of these cases have been mooted by the adoption, in 1966,
of SEC rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1974), they continue to be important
because of the approaches used by the courts. The most significant approach to arise
from conversion cases is the "economic equivalents" test. Under this test
there is no "sale" within the meaning of § 16(b) when one type of equity se-
curity is converted into another if the securities are substantial economic equiv-
alents and the conversion is "involuntary" in the sense that if there is no con-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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exercise of warrants 71 and options372 are covered by the Act. Many
version the owner will suffer substantial economic loss.
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, supra at 163. When the security converted and the security
received are considered merely different forms of the same participation in the issuer,
the absence of any possibility of speculative abuse is said to exist. See Blau v. Lamb,
supra at 521; Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra at 346. Contra, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,
supra at 164-65. And when the sale of the converted security would net a lesser amount
than the fair market value of the securities received, the conversion is deemed involun-
tary, or "compelled as a matter of economic necessity." Lynam v. Livingston, supra at
106. See also Ferraiolo v. Newman, supra at 346. Contra, Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster,
aupra at 168; Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, supra at 987. The conversion after the
securities had been called, rather than before, was held to be the distinguishing factor
in Lynam. See also note 366 supra.
369. In Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954),
the defendant and his family owned 97% of the common stock of Old Town Corpora-
tion in 1947. By 1952 the family's holdings were reduced to 45.9%. In that year the
directors of Old Town proposed a stock reclassification, which was authorized by holders
of over two-thirds of the outstanding shares as required by state law. Within six
months after receiving his new shares pursuant to the reclassification, the defendant sold
his newly acquired shares. The court, applying the subjective test, held that the receipt
of stock pursuant to the reclassification was not a "purchase." The court reasoned that
the cumulative effect of the following factors demonstrated that there was no possibility
of speculative abuse in the transaction: (1) the defendant had no control over the re-
classification, since shareholder approval by two-thirds of the outstanding shares was
needed; (2) the acquisition and sale were disclosed; (3) the defendant received securities
that had no pre-existing market value, and the market mechanisms that gave securities
value were of general knowledge; and (4) the defendant continued his interest in the
same company. Id. at 85-86.
370. In Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1966),
a corporation that was wholly owned by the defendant, pursuant to merger plans, trans-
ferred shares of Air-Way Industries to a third corporation, over which the defendant had
97% control. The court held that the transaction did not constitute a "purchase" by
the third corporation, but was merely a transfer between corporate pockets. Id. at 526.
In Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954),
Mission Corporation, pursuant to a plan to take over Tide Water Associated Oil Com-
pany, acquired over 10% of Tide Water's common stock. Thereafter, Mission trans-
ferred those shares to its wholly owned subsidiary, Mission Development Co., and within
six months again began purchasing shares of Tide Water. After finding that Mission,
"by virtue of its absolute control of Development," was an insider of Tide Water, the
court held that the exchange was not a "sale," but "a mere transfer between corporate
pockets." Id. at 80.
371. For a case holding that the director-stockholder's receipt of a warrant, issued
to all common shareholders of record, was not a "purchase," see Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172
F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (applying subjective test and
receipt of value-volition concepts). See also Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. Tnmcale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.
1950) (discussing subjective and objective approaches without coming to resolution).
For cases holding that the receipt of stock pursuant to the exercise of a warrant is
a "purchase," see Shaw v. Dreyfus, supra at 142; Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying objective approach).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/3
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decisions have applied the "objective" test, in which the broad statutory
definitions are applied literally to each transaction.3 7 8  The great
majority of courts, however, have applied the pragmatic, "subjective"
test.374 Under this test, the transaction in question is studied to deter-
mine whether it 75 could possibly lend itself to the kinds of speculative
372. For a case holding that an option contract is a "contract for sale," see Bershad
v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971)
(applying subjective test). Contra, Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir.
1962) ("[S]hould the options lapse unexercised . . . no change in . . . beneficial own-
ership of the underlying security would occur. And, most importantly, any change
would occur at the pleasure of the optionee.").
For cases holding that the exercise of an option is a "purchase," see Blau v. Ogsbury,
210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See also B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964) (assuming
exercise is a "purchase"); Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.
La. 1952), afj'd, 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (same).
SEC rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1974), was enacted to exempt stock acquired
pursuant to nontransferable options. The court in Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d
Cir. 1957), cast doubt on the validity of the rule. The rule was held invalid in Perlman
v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Perlman court stated that
the Commission had overstepped its powers in enacting the rule, since the transactions
exempted were surrounded by too much potential for abuse. Cf. B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v.
Lachner, supra at 259. The rule was amended in 1964 and now exempts the acquisition
of shares of stock received pursuant to certain corporate option plans.
373. For cases applying the "objective" test, see Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d
156 (3d Cir. 1965); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp.
650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lynam v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104 (D. Del. 1967); Blau v.
Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed sub nom. Truncale v. Scully, 182 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.
1950). See also Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967) (dissent by then Judge Blackmun encouraging application of "objec-
tive" approach because transaction fell within literal definition of "purchase").
374. For cases applying the "subjective" test, see Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425
F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528
(8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d
304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Alloys Unltd., Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See
also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
375. It is important to emphasize that in applying the subjective test the courts look
only to the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it to determine whether a pos-Washington University Open Scholarship
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abuse that section 16(b) was designed to prevent. The rationale be-
hind the subjective test was best outlined in Blau v. Lamb,376 in which
the Second Circuit stated:
It is quite apparent that because of the broad definitions of "purchase?
and "sale" imported into Section 16(b), this section may be applied not
only to routine cash purchases and sales of equity securities but also may
be applied to acquisitions and dispositions of equity securities in trans-
actions involving conversions, options, stock warrants, reclassifications
and the like. . . . [S]ome of these transactions may not lend themselves
in any way to an unfair use of inside information by corporate insid-
ers.
3 7 7
All the reported cases have adopted similar "pragmatic' reasoning
in determining when a particular transaction occurred.3 78 These cases
have attempted to determine which contended date of purchase or sale
most easily lent itself to speculative abuse of inside information. As
the First Circuit noted in Booth v. Varian Associates, 7 9
The question [of when the transaction occurred is] one of balancing the
respective advantages and disadvantages of each contended for "pur-
chase" date and determining which one, if held to be the date of pur-
chase, would be more likely to lend itself to the abuses the statute was
designed to protect against.380
All of the courts, in applying this "subjective" test, have followed the
conclusion of Blau v. Ogsbury3s' that the transaction is deemed to take
place when the insider is "irrevocably liable" to purchase or sell a fixed
sibility of speculative abuse existed. See, e.g., cases cited note 374 supra. But see Ber-
shad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971) (stock options may be used as "tool" for speculative abuse); cf. Petteys v.
Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 536 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967) ("As
a general proposition, conversions of equity securities are not transactions which nor-
mally lend themselves to shortswing speculation.").
376. 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
377. Id. at 516 (footnote omitted). See also Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 533
(8th Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967). But see Hell-Coil Corp. v. Web-
ster, 352 F.2d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 1965) ("[W]e are of the opinion . . . that it was the
intention of Congress in enacting § 16(b) to obviate any necessity for a search of mo-
tives of the insider or require an investigation of whether or not his actions were ani-
mated by inside information to gain a speculative profit.").
378. The determination of when a particular transaction took place is germane to the
issues of whether the transaction took place within the six-month period and how much
profit the insider realized, since that date will control for stock valuation purposes.
379. 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
380. Id. at 4. See also Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954).
381. 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
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quantity of stock at a fixed price A8 2 Thus, these courts uniformly have
rejected what normally would be considered the date the transaction
-took place-that is, the date the securities actually were exchanged for
value.
5. "Profit"
As with the question of determining whether there has been a
"purchase" or "sale," routine transactions cause few problems in
computing damages: the "profit' equals the cost less the proceeds. 38 3
Further, since shares of the same class of stock are fungible, tracing has
been deemed unnecessary, 84 and the courts have unanimously chosen
to follow the test for computation of profit first delineated in Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp. :385 the "lowest price in-highest price out" method.880
Under this method, profit is computed by matching the highest sales
price with the lowest purchase price within six months, the next highest
sales price with the next lowest purchase price within six months, and
so on, until all the shares are included in the computation. Then, the
differences between the amounts matched are added together to deter-
mine the total profit.
382. Id. at 427. For cases following Ogsbury, see Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d
693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Booth v. Varian Associates,
334 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Silverman v. Landa,
306 F.2d 422, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1962); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239
F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp.
100, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a!fd, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
383. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 167 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau
v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); Stella
v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 232
F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
384. See, e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 742-
43 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d
46, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See also Alloys Unltd,,
Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (suggesting that tracing may
be necessary where some shares were registered and some not).
385. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
386. For cases applying the "lowest price in-highest price out?' method, see Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Volk v. Zlotoff, 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Arkansas La.
Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Ark. 1956); Steinberg
v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1951).Washington University Open Scholarship
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This strict rule for computing profits was adopted because, more than
other possible techniques in which sales are matched with purchases,
the rule serves to promote full compliance with the purpose of the 1934
Act387 by maximizing the profits that can be recovered. 388 In fact, the
insider is often required to disgorge to the corporation "profits" on
some of the securities he has sold even though he has sustained an
overall loss. 89
The most difficult problems in computing profits have arisen when
one of the transactions involved an option, a convertible security, or a
similar security. One court has set the cost of the stock received
upon exercise of the option at "the exercise price of the option
plus the value of the option on the day that it accrued as fixed by
the employment agreement under the terms of which it accrued."39 0
The court's adoption of the accrual date for valuation purposes has
been followed in a number of decisions, even in light of the courts
seemingly contradictory adoption of the exercise date for the determi-
nation of the six-month requirement.391 Today, many of these compu-
tation problems have been alleviated by rule 16b-6, which limits the
calculation of profit in certain option transactions to "the differ-
ence between the proceeds of sale and the lowest market price of
any security of the same class within six months before or after the date
of sale."'3 2
The final issue concerning the computation of profits is whether cer-
tain consequential receipts and costs should be considered in the cal-
387. For an interesting case applying the statutory purpose of strict compliance, see
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. La. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d
433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (court refused to adopt defendant's
argument that since he was domiciled in community property state he need disgorge only
one-half of his profits).
388. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920
(1951); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
751 (1943).
389. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
390. Steinberg v. Sharpe, 95 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aif'd, 190 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1951) (emphasis original).
391. See, e.g., B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964); Volk v.
Zlotoff, 318 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
392. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1974). The adoption of SEC rule 16b-6 has been held
valid in a number of cases. See, e.g., Kornfield v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.
1964); Volk v. Zlotoff, 318 F. Supp. 864, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Blau v. Hodgkinson,
100 F. Supp. 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Vol. 1974:815]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/3
892 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
culation. The cases, have unanimously held that the allowance of in-
terest lies in the discretion of the court. 303 Whether interest will be
allowed is based upon the equities of the case;"0 4 if it is allowed, interest
begins running from the date the profit was realized. 03 On the other
hand, the courts have split on whether dividends should be considered
part of the profit realized.3 96  One court based its allowance of
dividends on whether there was a possibility of insider manipulation of
the dividend.3 97  Another court has held that the inclusion in the
damages of a "control premium" was justified, 0 8 although this result
has been severely criticized."'
6. Summary
These decisions illustrate that the courts have viewed each of the
substantive elements of section 16(b) differently. Most courts have
followed the pragmatic, "subjective" approach in construing the fol-
lowing elements in a particular transaction: "beneficial owner" (for
purposes of the opening transaction), "officer," "purchase" and "sale,"
and "profit." On the other hand, most courts have followed the
393. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 744 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d
843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp.
382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962,
968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
394. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 744 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966)
(allowed interest); Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (disallowed
interest); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (disallowed interest because transaction was innocent); Perfect Photo, Inc. v.
Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (allowed interest).
395. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 744 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 231 F.2d
843, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
396. For cases allowing dividends, see Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 348 F.2d 736, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Mar-
quette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For cases
denying dividends, see Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 528 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1959).
397. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 968 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
398. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 357-58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970). The "control premium" was an estimate of the additional value of
the shares to RKO because they gave RKO legal control of Frontier Airlines, Inc.
399. Gadsby & Treadwell, supra note 302, at 693-94; 37 J. Am & COMM. L. 457,
463-64 (1971).
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"objective" approach in construing the elements "equity security,"
"class of security," "beneficial owner," "director," timing of the status
of "director" and "officer," and "six months" in a particular factual
situation.
More often than not, the reason given by the courts for the applica-
tion of either approach is the need to effectuate the broadly remedial
purpose of the 1934 Act. Each element is analyzed to determine
whether its scope should be expanded or limited in light of this pur-
pose. Arguably, therefore, some of those courts that adopt the objec-
tive approach first engage in the same pragmatic determination of
whether the particular element should be literally construed, by find-
ing, in effect, that the analysis adopted by the legislature is appropriate.
On the other hand, some courts that have adopted the objective ap-
proach have followed the analysis of Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster °° that
Congress has already engaged in a delicate balancing process in
drafting section 16(b), and therefore the judicial role should be
limited to applying literal terms to particular transactions.
This was the judicial state of affairs concerning section 16(b) before
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts began their most re-
cent analysis in late 1971.
B. Recent Developments
Most decisions by the lower federal courts prior to the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.401
and Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.402 followed
the mainstream of the law previously discussed; no new rules, nor new
theories for old rules, were announced. Instead, these recent decisions
are important for their reinforcement of previous judicial patterns.
1. Miscellaneous
In the area of the definition of statutory insiders, two significant
opinions appeared. In Levy v. Seaton403 the court was faced with a
situation "[wihere both the purchase and the sale [occurred] within six
months of each other [but] after the officer [had] left the employ of
400. 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
401. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
402. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
403. 358 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the corporation. '40 4  Seaton was a vice president of General Motors
from January 1957 to August 31, 1970. On March 19, 1962, General
Motors granted Seaton a stock option for the purchase of common
shares at $56.82 per share. Under the terms of the agreement, the op-
tion would expire three months after Seaton left General Motors. On
November 24, 1970, Seaton sold 2000 shares of General Motors stock
at $75.50 per share, and -three days later acquired 2151 shares through
the exercise of the option. The court held that Seaton was not liable
for the profits he received, distinguishing Adler v. Klawans 03 and
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.40 6 on the ground -that in both of those
cases the defendant was a director during at least one of the transac-
tions. The Levy court reasoned that "where a person is neither an offi-
cer at the time of purchase nor at the time of sale . . . there is no stat-
utory rule that he is conclusively presumed to have acquired 'informa-
tion .. by reason of his relationship to the issuer' ... 40
Levy is significant in two respects. First, the court implicitly recog-
nized a statutory "conclusive presumption" that certain individuals have
acquired and used inside information. Secondly, the court stated that
this presumption no longer exists if neither transaction occurred while
the defendant was an officer, even if he was an officer three months
before. The language of the statute does not indicate whether
an officer or director need be an insider during both transactions.403
For this reason, the court could have adopted a subjective analysis and
searched the facts to determine whether a possibility of speculative
abuse existed as a result of Seaton's prior position. Instead, the court re-
mained steadfast in its strict, objective application of the statute.
The question whether the owner of less than ten percent of a corpo-
404. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis original).
405. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). See text accompanying notes 338-43 supra.
406. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). See text
accompanying notes 344-45 supra.
407. 358 F. Supp. at 5, quoting 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
408. Except for the exemption clause, the statutory language, is unclear as to all in-
siders. For this reason, the courts in Adler and Feder relied heavily on the statute's
exemption language. Arguably, the use of the word "both" in the exemption implies,
with respect to officers and directors, "at least one." But, if, as the introductory lan-
guage makes clear, the statute was intended to limit the use of inside information ac-
quired by insiders "by reason of their relationship to the issuer," the statute arguably
did apply to the transactions in question, since they might have been based on inside
information Seaton acquired while still an officer of General Motors. Thus the statute
may apply to one who was a director or officer "at some time." Adler v. Klawans, 267
F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959) (emphasis original).
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ration's convertible preferred stock could be considered a ten-percent
"beneficial owner" for purposes of the corporation's common stock was
answered in the affirmative in American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.40 9
The court applied the "hypothetical conversion" test,410 in which the
defendant is considered a ten-percent beneficial owner if upon a
hypothetical conversion of his preferred stock he would own more than
ten percent of the common. The rule is not based on a subjective
analysis of whether, by reason of his ownership of the preferred, the
defendant had access to inside information. Instead, it is based on the
economic reality that the holder of convertible preferred stock easily
and swiftly may become an owner of common stock.
A number of recent cases have been concerned with problems
of purchases and sales. On the whole, these decisions have reaffirmed
the proposition that section 16(b) automatically applies (that is, the
courts have no difficulty applying the section) to "ordinary" purchases
and sales.41' The difficulties continue to arise in attempting to apply
the statute to "unorthodox" transactions.
Two cases considered the problem of corporate reorganization. In
Morales v. Arlen Realty & Development Corp. 12 defendant Weisman,
an officer and director of Spartan Industries, received shares of Arlen
Realty pursuant to an exchange agreement which became effective
when Spartan merged with Arlen. Weisman also became a di-
rector of Arlen. Within six months, Weisman sold some of his
newly acquired shares. After finding that Weisman had no control
over the planning or ratification of the merger, the Morales court held
that the acquisition of shares pursuant to the exchange agreement was
not a purchase.41 3 Weisman's involvement in the exchange was con-
sidered involuntary. 1 4
The court in American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,415 on the other
409. 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
410. See SEC rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b) (1974); cf. Chemical Fund,
Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1967).
411. See, e.g., Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 465 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1972) (to
apply subjective test, facts must rise above case of "garden variety" purchase and sale);
Morales v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 941, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (no rea-
son to apply subjective test when ordinary purchases and sales involved).
412. 352 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
413. Id. at 945. The court specifically stated:
In the absence of a showing that he wielded any control over the terms or tim-
ing of the Arlen-Spartans merger, his acquisition of Arlen stock pursuant to
the merger did not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of § 16(b).
414. Id.; see text accompanying note 361 supra.
415. 346 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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hand, considered the element of control over the timing and terms of
the merger to be a factor in determining whether the merger gave rise
to a possibility of speculative abuse. Beginning in mid-1967 Crane had
engaged in a tender offer program to buy Westinghouse Air Brake
common stock. By January 26, 1968, Crane owned more than ten
percent of Air Brake. In response, Air Brake entered into merger
negotiations with American Standard, and on March 7, 1968, they
announced to the public that a merger agreement had been reached.
The agreement did not hinder Crane's efforts, however, for on April
6th, Crane publicly announced a new tender offer. The tender offer
failed, for at the close of the offering period Crane owned only thirty-
two percent of Air Brake, and on May 16, 1968, the other stockholders
of Air Brake voted to approve the merger. Soon after receiving its
shares of American Standard for its Air Brake shares, Crane sold them
at a profit.
The American Standard court applied a two-part test to the exchange
transaction. After first determining that the possibility of spec-
ulative abuse existed, the court considered whether the transac-
tion could reasonably be considered a purchase or sale. In deciding
that the possibility of speculative abuse existed, the court presumed that
ten-percent beneficial owners have inside information. 416 Further, the
court found the presumption in this case was supported by the facts:
Crane continued its tender offers, knowing that whether it won or lost
the proxy fight, it would still benefit; Crane continued its tender offers,
knowing that Air Brake was engaged in merger negotiations; and, by
its holdings, Crane could influence the terms and timing of the
merger.411
It is significant that the American Standard court refused to examine
closely the facts surrounding the exchange transaction. Instead, the
court emphasized Crane's tenacity in light of the odds against it and
the possible influence Crane might wield. The court did not, how-
ever, seek to determine whether this tenacity or influence specifically
enabled Crane to gain access to inside information. Further, the court
ignored the problem that Crane's influence existed while it was an in-
sider of Air Brake, not while it was an insider of American Standard-
the status that it held when the sale took place.
416. Id. at 1159.
417. Id.
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Two recent cases have considered whether the receipt of stock pur-
suant to the exercise of a non-transferable, qualified stock option is a
"purchase." Although the courts in Brenner v. Career Academy,
Inc.4"8 and Keller Industries, Inc. v. Walden419 held that the receipt
was a "purchase," the significance of the opinions lies in the courts'
treatment of the insiders' allegations that the purchases were exempted
by rules 16b-9420 and 16b-3, 421 respectively. In Brenner the court re-
fused to exempt the purchase, holding that a stock option is not an
acquisition of the type exempted by rule 16b-9.4 2 In Keller the court
reemphasized the parenthetical language of rule 16b-3423 and held
that the inducement of preferable tax treatment for holding the option
for a certain length of time -42 4 does not alter the specific exception from
the exemption under the rule.
Finally, one recent case considered the question of when the pur-
chase or sale was deemed to have taken place. In Champion Home
Builders Co. v. Jeffress,4 -5 Champion acquired Concord Mobile Homes
by purchasing all of Concord's stock, then owned by Jeffress, in ex-
change for thirteen percent of Champion's stock and a directorship for
Jeffress. The exchange agreement was entered into by Jeffress and two
officers of Champion on February 17, 1968, subject to the ratification
of the directors, who approved the contract by resolution on February
21, 1968. The formal agreement was executed on April 17, 1968. Jeff-
ress sold a portion of his holdings on September 17, 1968. The district
418. 467 F.2d 1080 (7thCir. 1972).
419. 462 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1972).
420. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1974).
421. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1974).
422. 467 F.2d at 1083.
This holding seems somewhat strained in light of the statutory definition of "equity
security" contained in § 3(a)(l1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970).
See text quoted note 299 supra. The statutory definition includes both "warrants" and
'rights." Judicial precedent, however, seems split on the question. See, e.g., Bershad v.
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971)
(suggesting that option is equity security); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949) (warrant is equity security). See also Chemical Fund,
Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussion of definition of equity
security); Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962) (discussion of definition
of equity security); Laufer, supra note 302, at 236.
423. 462 F.2d at 390. The parenthetical language, "other than stock acquired upon
the exercise of an option, warrant or right," excepts from the rule's general exemption
the receipt of stock pursuant to the exercise of an option.
424. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 422.
425. 490 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'g 352 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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court, following the traditional test that the purchase and sale take place
when the parties are "irrevocably bound," held that Jeffress did not
acquire his Champion shares within six months of the sale. The trial
court found that
on February 21 the parties had reached a meeting of the minds on the
essentials of their exchange agreement and . . . if matters had there-
after bogged down in the drafting of a formal contract, either party
could have sued to enforce the contract or for its breach. Since this
was merely a purchase of stock by Champion, all that was needed to
bind the corporation to the deal was the approval of the Board of
Directors. 42 6
The court added that since Jeffress participated in the directors' meet-
ing at the time the contract was approved, he "became privy to informa-
tion disclosed at that meeting and the public was led to believe that
Jeffress was an 'insider' from that time forward. 427 The Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that no "purchase' had occurred with the February
21st resolution. The appellate court found that the resolution had the
legal effect of "nothing more than an authorization to negotiate, ' 42
which did not render Jeffress irrevocably bound to take and pay for
the stock or vest in him any incidents of ownership.
The final area that concerned the courts was profits. The six-month
provision in rule 16b-6 was construed by one court to mean a full six-
month period;4 29 another court considered the "date of transfer" as the
426. 352 F. Supp. at 1083.
427. Id. at 1084. The court further noted that the statute of frauds did not alter
this holding since the minutes of the board meeting were a sufficient writing. Id. It
is interesting to note in this regard that that statute of frauds, if it applies, may signifi-
cantly affect the result under § 16(b) if the "irrevocably bound" test is applied.
428. 490 F.2d at 617. Both Ieffress courts thus agreed that the "irrevocably bound"
test, see cases cited note 382 supra, should be employed. They differed, however, in
their view of the commitment to purchase reflected in the resolution of February 21st.
The Sixth Circuit emphasized the following contingencies:
Jeffress incurred no irrevocable liability to take and pay for the Champion
stock because he had not signed the Board minutes. Moreover, because there
had been no consideration or contractual intent, the resolution cannot be
viewed as giving him an option to buy Champion stock. Although resolutions
such as the one before us are a prerequisite to corporate transactions of the
type here involved, they are only a prelude to negotiations and may be ren-
dered ineffective when the negotiations deadlock.
490 F.2d at 617. The court held that the transaction did not present a potential for
speculative abuse, since at the time of the resolution, Jeffress was not a statutory insider
of Champion, nor did he have advance knowledge of the merger. Id.
429. Morales v. Walt Disney Prods., 361 F. Supp. 1157, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
The court rejected the argument that the six-months-less-one-day period of the statute
should apply under the rule. See note 356 supra.Washington University Open Scholarship
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appropriate date for measuring profits under the rule.4 30 The most
important recent decision in this area, however, was Mouldings, Inc.
v. Potter.4 31  Potter, an officer and director of Mouldings, sold 8000
shares of Mouldings through his broker. A few days later, the broker
discovered that the securities were not registered and thus could not
be sold. Therefore, Potter became liable to the broker to replenish
the shares. To avoid section 16(b) liability, Potter engaged in a pro-
cess of novation: a group of business associates acted as sellers by
tak[ing] his place in the transaction ab initio. He would return to [the
broker] the sum which he had already received from [him]. The [sell-
ers] would take over his obligation to sell and [the broker] would pay
them the original sum as sellers.4 32
These new shares were received at a lower price. After finding that
the novation transaction was a purchase, the court held that Potter
,.realized" a profit in the transaction, since he had control over the
ultimate destination of the profits. The court reasoned that
[o]ne intent of § 16(b) is to cast the officer-director thereunder into
a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all the shareholders of the corpo-
ration. We cannot countenance an effort by such a fiduciary to prefer
some stockholders over others through control and designation of prof-
its.43a
2. "Subjective" v. "Objective" Approach
The two most important recent cases construing section 16(b) are
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.43 4 and Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,430 for the Supreme Court
chose these two cases as vehicles for entering and resolving a portion
of the quagmire created by the decisions of the lower federal courts
concerning the scope of the substantive elements of section 16(b).436
430. Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc., 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972).
431. 465 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
432. Id. at 1103.
433. Id. at 1105.
434. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
435. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
436. Prior to Reliance and Kern County, the Supreme Court had decided only one
other case under § 16(b). In Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), the Court followed
the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564,
566 (2d Cir. 1952), in holding that a partnership was liable for the profits it re-
ceived from short-swing trading in the shares of a corporation, if the partnership
had puted a partner to represent its interests as director of that corporation. See also
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a. Reliance Electric
In Reliance Electric, Emerson Electric acquired 13.2% of the
outstanding common stock of Dodge Manufacturing pursuant to a ten-
der offer in an unsuccessful attempt to take over Dodge. The attempt
was defeated by Dodge's defensive merger agreement with Reliance
Electric, which had been authorized by Dodge's shareholders. Within
six months of its acquisition, Emerson, pursuant to counsel's recom-
mendation, engaged in two transactions: first, Emerson sold enough
of its Dodge shares to reduce its holdings to 9.96%; secondly, two
weeks later Emerson sold its remaining shares to Dodge. As a result
of both sales, Emerson realized a substantial profit.
Emphasizing the objective nature of the statute, the Supreme Court
held that Emerson would be liable only for those profits received as
a result of the first sale. The Court described in broad terms the
method that Congress chose to remedy the speculative abuses caused
by insider trading: Congress chose to take the profit out of a "class
of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be in-
tolerably great. '43 7 Thus, since Congress did not mean to reach every
transaction in which an insider actually used inside information, the
question became whether the transaction, consciously structured to take
it outside the literal prohibition of section 16(b), was also outside the
intolerable "class of transactions." Citing the language of the statutory
exemption438 and reading its terms literally, the Court concluded that
Emerson's second sale was a transaction that Congress did not intend
to cover.
The Reliance Electric Court's short discussion of the congressional
intention to cover a "class of transactions" seems to have been more
than a mere introductory discussion of section 16(b). The Court, in-
Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
437. 404 U.S. at 422. The Court's use of the term "class of transactions" did not
refer to the nature of the transaction, i.e., whether it was a cash sale or a merger. In-
stead, the Court indicated that it was referring to a transaction defined in the terms of
the statute's substantive elements.
438. "This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such ben-
eficial owner was not such both at the time of the pu~rchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved .... " 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970).
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stead, emphasized that only those transactions defined by section 16(b)
were considered by Congress to fall within that "class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably
great. ' 4 1 In other words, liability was not defined in terms of an indi-
vidual's status in the corporation; instead, it was defined in terms of
a "class of transactions" in which the status of the individual was merely
an element. Thus, in order for any statutory presumption to arise, all
of the elements of the forbidden transaction must exist.
In Reliance Electric all the elements of the forbidden transaction were
present in the first sale, but the ten-percent beneficial-ownership
requirement was absent in the second sale. Justice Douglas, dissent-
ing, asserted that the absence of this element was cured by the statutory
presumption that ownership of ten percent of the stock "suffices to pro-
vide access to inside information."44  The majority, rejecting Justice
Douglas's position, stated that the statutory exemption clearly ruled out
this position as a basis for liability.
To reject the dissent's position so easily, however, the majority had
to read the language of the exemption literally. The reason for this
literal reading was that the requirement created by the exemption was
"among the 'objective standards' contained in § 16(b)."4 l  No explicit
reason was given why this requirement should be read objectively,
since the Court did recognize that certain factors may be defined sub-
jectively. Instead, the Court suggested that a subjective construction
of this requirement was impossible without predicating liability upon
considerations of intent, motive, or improper conduct that are irrelevant
to section 16(b).442
This analysis suggests that the Court in Reliance Electric sanctioned
the use of the subjective approach in defining certain statutory ele-
439. 404 U.S. at 422.
440. Id. at 442.
441. Id. at 423.
442. In a footnote, the Court recognized that the terms "purchase," "sale," "officer,"
and "director" may be subjectively defined. But the Court's insistence upon an objective
construction was emphasized by the language of the closing two sentences of the foot-
note. The Court stated:
The various tests employed in these cases [that applied the subjective ap-
proach] are used to determine whether a transaction, objectively defined, falls
within or without the terms of the statute. In no case is liability predicated
upon "considerations of intent, lack of motive, or improper conduct" that are
irrelevant in § 16(b) suits. Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 887
[(S.D.N.Y. 1966)].
404 U.S. at 424 n.4.
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ments, as long as the application of this approach does not require proof
of those factors the statute deems irrelevant. The analysis also
suggests that the holding of Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.443
may be in jeopardy.444
b. Kern County
The Court's implicit approval of the use of the subjective approach
for defining the terms "purchase" and "sale" in Reliance Electric was
transformed into explicit approval by the majority in Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.445 Rejecting the objective
approach, the majority instead inquired whether the "unorthodox"
transaction served as a vehicle for the realization of short-swing profits
based upon access to inside information. 44 1  After engaging in a de-
tailed factual analysis, the majority held that because there was an ab-
sence of any possibility of speculative abuse, the transaction was not
a "sale."
After unsuccessfully seeking to merge with Kern County Land
Company (Old Kern), Occidental Petroleum announced a tender offer
for 500,000 shares of Old Kern common stock. As a result of the suc-
cess of this first tender offer,447 Occidental extended its offer to encom-
pass an additional 500,000 shares. By June 8, 1967, Occidental owned
887,549 shares of Old Kern. The Old Kern management attempted to
frustrate Occidental's takeover bid by advising its shareholders against
tendering and by engaging in merger discussions with Tenneco, Inc.
On May 19, 1967, the board of directors of Old Kern announced its
approval of the Tenneco merger proposal. Under the proposal, Kern
County Land Company (New Kern) was to be formed to receive the
assets and carry on the business of Old Kern.
Occidental realized that if the defensive merger were approved it
would be locked into a minority position in Tenneco, and therefore it
443. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See notes 330-34 supra and accompanying
text.
444. See, e.g., Turner, Securities Law-"Split Sale" § 16(b) Liability of Beneficial
Owners for Short-Swing Profits-Reliance Electric Company v. Emerson Electric Com-
pany, 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972), 49 DENVER L.I. 69 (1972); Comment, Split Sale Schemes
Under Section 16(b): Additional Justification for the Supreme Court Majority's Ap-
proach in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 45 TEM:PLE L.Q. 501 (1972);
25 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1973); 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 206 (1972).
445. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). See note 442 supra and accompanying text.
446. Id. at 594.
447. At the close of the first tender offer, Occidental owned over 107o of Old Kern.
Id. at 585.Washington University Open Scholarship
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took steps to protect itself. Primarily, it negotiated an arrangement
with Tenneco by which Occidental gave a subsidiary of Tenneco an
option to purchase all of Tenneco's preferred stock to which Occidental
would be entitled pursuant to the merger exchange. By the terms of
the option agreement, the option could not be exercised until six
months and one day after the expiration of Occidental's tender offer.
On June 2, 1967, Occidental and Tenneco exercised the option. The
merger plan was presented to and approved by Old Kern stockholders
on July 17, 1967. Occidental did not vote its shares, but stated that
it did not oppose the merger. The merger transaction was closed on
August 30th, and Occidental received its preferred shares of Tenneco
pursuant to the exchange on December 11, 1967, six months and three
days after the close of Occidental's tender offer. Tenneco's subsidiary
then exercised the option.
After reiterating the belief expressed in Reliance Electric that Con-
gress, in enacting section 16(b), meant to regulate a particular "class
of transactions,"44 the Kern County majority adopted the "subjective"
approach to determine whether an unorthodox transaction is a "pur-
chase" or "sale. '44 9 The reason for the adoption of the subjective ap.
proach was the fear that the broad definitions of "purchase' and "sale'
may "at least arguably, reach many transactions not ordinarly deemed
a sale or purchase."450  The element missing from such "unorthodox
transactions" is volition.45' Arguably, therefore, the majority's reason
for adopting the subjective approach was the fear that if the statute
were literally applied, certain insider's activities would be covered
by the statute even though the exchange of value was involuntary. Such
an approach was considered too harsh in light of the congressional poli-
cies behind section 16(b). 5 2
Since the terms "purchase" and "sale" were construed in view of the
policies behind section 16(b), the element of volition also had
448. Id. at 592, citing Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422
(1972).
449. 411 U.S. at 594. The use of the subjective approach to define a "purchase" or
"sale" is appropriate under the majority's narrowly stated test, for by its use liability
will not be predicated on considerations of intent, motive, or improper conduct.
450. Id.
451. See note 366 supra. But see 411 U.S. at 607 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
452. This approach of defining the terms "purchase" and "sale" in light of the poli-
cies of § 16(b) is supported by the preamble to 1934 Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)
(1970), which permits the terms defined therein to be construed differently if "the con-
text otherwise requires."
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to be defined in light of those policies. Thus, volition was con-
sidered present whenever "the particular type of transaction involved
is one that gives rise to speculative abuse. '453
Although the subjective test was broadly stated in Kern County, it
was not so broadly applied, for instead of looking to broadly defined
"types of transactions,' 454 as Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent,45r
the majority closely scrutinized Occidental's position and the facts lead-
ing up to the point when the company was "irrevocably entitled to ex-
change its shares of Old Kern stock for shares of Tenneco preferred
stock. '14 6 The majority emphasized that at each stage in the activities
Occidental had no control over future events 457 and that the type of in-
formation it possessed was available to the general public, and, conse-
quently, was not inside information. Further, Old Kern's efforts to deter
Occidental's takeover bid placed Occidental in the position of an outsider
insofar as the availability of inside information was concerned. There-
fore, the majority concluded, "the involuntary nature of Occidental's ex-
change, when coupled with the absence of the possibility of speculative
abuse of inside information,"4 58 kept the transaction from falling within
the ambit of section 16(b).
453. 411 U.S. at 595, quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418,
424 n.4 (1972). In this context, the Court was using the term "transaction" in its nar-
row sense, that is, not as a "class of transactions" in which all the elements of § 16(b)
are present, but as an activity in which value is exchanged.
454. 411 U.S. at 609. Under a broad-definition approach, all mergers may be con-
sidered the type of transaction which gives rise to speculative abuse, while defensive mer-
gers may not.
455. 411 U.S. at 609 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
456. 411 U.S. at 596. Considering the date of the alleged sale as the date when Oc-
cidental became irrevocably bound was consistent with prior case law. See note 382 su-
pra and accompanying text.
457. The majority, citing cases dealing with coercion due to economic feasibility, also
rejected the claim that since Occidental could have sold its shares for cash, a transac-
tion which would be considered a sale, the actual exchange should be considered a sale.
411 U.S. at 600. The cases cited, however, do not support this conclusion, for they deal
with pure economic coercion, and not economic coercion coupled with a legal liability,
as in Kern County.
458. 411 U.S. at 600. That the majority separated the requirement of volition from
that of the possibility of speculative abuse does not detract from their interrelatedness.
Although a transaction may be involuntary in that the person has no control over the
course of certain future events, the fact that the person may have certain inside informa-
tion may make the transaction voluntary in that the person may wish to react to those
events in a particular manner. For example, if Occidental had inside information con-
cerning the exchange rate between Old Kern and Tenneco, it may have wished to buy
in further, not with the intention of completing its takeover, but with the knowledge that
the exchange rate would make it economically beneficial.Washington University Open Scholarship
SECURITIES REGULATION
Similar reasoning led the majority to conclude that the option agree-
ment itself was not a "sale." First, since there were mutual advantages
to be gained from the arrangement, Occidentars motivations did not
"smack" of insider trading."6 9 Furthermore, because the call price was
fixed in the option, even if Occidental possessed inside information, it
could not have taken advantage of it. It was not a case of "heads I
win, tails I don't lose."460
c. Gold v. Sloan
The most significant case to apply Kern County's subjective test has
been Gold v. Sloan.461 In Gold, four insiders462 of Atlantic Research
Corporation (ARC) received shares of Susquehanna Corporation when
ARC merged into Susquehanna. In addition, the four defendants be-
came insiders of Susquehanna.461 3 Within six months of the receipt of
these shares, the insiders sold a number of shares at a profit. The sole
issue was whether the exchange of shares pursuant to the merger con-
stituted a "purchase" within the terms of the statute.
The Gold majority, after discussing the Kern County decision, found
defendant Sloan liable and dismissed the actions against the others. In
essence, the court found that the possibility of speculative abuse was
available only to Sloan. To reach this conclusion, the court discussed
in detail the positions and roles of the four defendants in the merger
negotiations, and found that only one was in a position not only to re-
ceive inside information but also to control the negotiations.46 4 Further,
459. 411 U.S. at 601. It is interesting to note that the majority spoke freely of
motivation, while the Court in Reliance Electric considered motivation irrelevant.
460. See Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
461. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 491 F.2d
729 (4th Cir. 1974) (Haynsworth, CJ., dissenting).
462. Prior to November 1962, defendant Sloan was the president and chief executive
officer of ARC. In November he was removed from the office of president and made
chairman of the board. Defendant Rumbel was an officer in ARC. Defendant Scur-
lock was the chief executive officer and a director of ARC. Defendant Sloane was a
vice president of ARC.
463. After the merger Scurlock became a director of Susquehanna, Sloan became
chief executive officer of Susquehanna, Rumbel became senior vice president of a divi-
sion of Susquehanna, and Sloane became a vice president of the same division.
464. Thus the interconnected elements of possibility of speculative abuse and voli-
tion were present. The inquiry into access to inside information and control was
appropriate since these two elements were relied upon by the Kern County majority.
See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 599-600. See
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not only was Sloan in a position to engage in these activities, he also
did receive inside information.0 5
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Gold takes Kern County to its
logical conclusion. First, under the subjective approach a transaction
may now be a "purchase" with respect to one insider, but not a "pur-
chase" with respect to another. This seems ludicrous when one trans-
action is involved. Secondly, the primary reason for this seemingly
anomalous result is the Gold court's extremely detailed analysis of the
insiders' roles in the ,transaction. The mere position of the insider
(that is, as director or president) was not enough; he also had to be
in a position where he could have received inside information.
The Gold court's detailed analysis is a cause for much concern.
If the basis of the subjective test is whether there has been a possibility
of speculative abuse, why was it necessary to determine whether the
insider possessed inside information? An insider may now regulate his
activities to avoid leaving any evidence of his possession of inside infor-
mation and thus avoid liability under a statute that was originally in-
tended to be a "crude rule of thumb" 460 predicating liability on
objective criteria. Further, although an insider may have no power to
alter the outcome of the merger negotiations, why should this lack of
choice affect the determination of whether the particular transaction
was a "purchase"? The majority's fear in Kern County that an insider
may be liable under section 16(b) by the mere fact of his involuntary
receipt of stock does not exist when an initial transaction is involved,
for the defendants in Gold still could have chosen whether to sell the
stock within six months after the merger.
This latter consideration was a cause of concern to Judge Winter,
who dissented in Gold. Judge Winter disagreed with the majority's re-
fusal to consider whether the insiders had access to inside information
after the merger was completed.4"7 He stated that the majority could
also Dietz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 Foan-
mm L. REV. 1, 25 (1974); Lang & Katz, Section 16(b) and "Extraordinary" Trans-
actions: Corporate Reorganizations and Stock Options, 49 Noam D sE LAw. 705, 712
(1974).
465. 486 F.2d at 352.
466. Justice Douglas expressed this fear in his dissent in Kern County. See Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 608-09. Note, too, that
the preamble to § 16(b) states that the purpose of the statute is to prevent "the unfair
use of inside information which may have been obtained" by an insider. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
467. 486 F.2d at 354-56.Washington University Open Scholarship
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not rely on Kern County for this proposition, since that case dealt with
a closing transaction, while the Gold court was faced with an opening
transaction. Further, prior to the merger the defendants were not in-
siders of the corporation to which they would be liable.
Thus, it is at least questionable whether the subjective approach can
be applied to an opening transaction. As an administration spokesman
pointed out before a Senate committee in 1934,
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell
the security within six months after, because it will be absolutely impos-
sible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you
have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake
the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the time he
bought, to get out on a short swing.468
Access to information at the time of the opening transaction, therefore,
is irrelevant, at least to the extent that the information does not consist
of data indicating that the stock could be sold at a profit within the
next six months.469  Whether the insider has access to inside informa-
tion concerning merely the practicability of consummating the opening
transaction is irrelevant, since the benefits received from that trans-
action alone are not recoverable under the Act. On the other hand,
access to the same information concerning the closing transaction is
relevant, since the profit received through that transaction is the very
profit which the statute sought to discourage.
In light of the difficulties inherent in Kern County and its progeny,
Gold, the fears expressed by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Kern
County are easy to understand.
Instead of a section that is easy to administer and by its clearcut terms
discourages litigation, we have instead a section that'fosters litigation
because the Court's decision holds out the hope for the insider that he
may void § 16(b) liability.470
Further, if the majority's language in Gold471 is taken literally, and the
plaintiff is required to prove actual possession of inside informa-
tion, section 16(b) begins to look very much like section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, 72 for under that section the petitioner must prove that a
468. Hearings, supra note 289, at 6557 (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
469. See generally 72 MICH. L. REv. 592 (1974).
470. 411 U.S. at 612 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
471. 486 F.2d at 352.
472. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See Gadsby & Treadway, supra note 302, at 714-
15; Comment, supra note 444, at 516; Note, supra note 283, at 158-59 (all suggesting
that rule lob-5 may be employed in borderline cases).
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person knew a material fact that he misrepresented or failed to disclose
prior to a purchase or sale.4 73
C. Conclusion
It is not difficult to perceive why the subjective approach is applied.
Attaching liability to a certain "class of transactions" may not only be
harsh but also contrary -to the legislative purpose of curbing speculative
abuse of inside information. Section 16(b) can remain a "crude rule
of thumb" for those "transactions" to which it obviously applies. For
borderline "transactions," the "context '474 may require a definition
other than those provided in section 3 (a) of the 1934 Act. Moreover,
the subjective test, while seemingly contrary to the objective nature of
the statute, is not unreasonable. If it is assumed that section 16(b)
should not apply in certain borderline situations, the subjective test is
the most appropriate test for fulfilling the purpose of the section.
More important, unless the section is amended, the subjective ap-
proach, with all its ramifications, is apparently here to stay. The
most important concern for potential litigants, therefore, is to determine
under what circumstances they will be subjected to liability. Obviously,
if a person is an insider, at the time of both the opening and closing
transactions, who voluntarily exchanges value for securities and within
six months voluntarily exchanges his securities for value at a profit, he
will be liable under section 16(b). Liability, however, becomes less
predictable when the person is an officer who engages in an "unortho-
dox transaction" that could be subjectively characterized as a "purchase"
and "sale." If the statute were rewritten to incorporate judicial inter-
pretations, it might read as follows: 475
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer
by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any
473. Obviously, § 10(b) is somewhat different from § 16(b) in that under § 16(b)
an insider would still be liable even if he did disclose the information. Other require-
ments under § 16(b) also do not apply to § 10(b), such as the insider requirement and
the six-month requirement.
474. 1934 Act § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970) (preamble).
475. The ellipses in the hypothetical indicate sections omitted from the present stat-
ute to conform to judicial constructions; additions are printed in italics. The statute as
presently in force is set out in note 295 supra.
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period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such beneficial owner, director or officer in entering into such trans-
action . . .47 Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or
in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but
no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such
profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such . . .477 at the time
of the closing purchase or sale of the security involved, or any transac-
tion where such officer or director was not such at either the time of
the purchase or the sale, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended
within the purpose of this subsection.
(1) For purposes of this subsection only, the term "director" means
any director of a corporation, or any person performing a similar func-
tion, or, in a borderline case, any person similarly situated who has ac-
cess to inside information.
(2) For purposes of this subsection only, the term "officer" means
any officer of a corporation, or any person performing a similar func-
tion, or, in a borderline case, any person similarly situated who has ac-
cess to inside information.
(3) For purposes of this subsection only, the term "purchase"
means any receipt of a security for value that is voluntary or subject
to the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information.
(4) For purposes of this subsection only, the term "sale" means any
476. Section 16(b) presently includes a phrase which explains that the intention
the section mandates is irrelevant. The section imposes liability
... irrespective of any intention... of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Reference to the nature of the intention
has been deleted since the courts have construed the present statutory language very
broadly. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 n.4
(1972). See also note 469 supra and accompanying text.
477. The deleted language is: "was not such both at the time of the pur-
chase and sale, or the sale and purchase." 1934 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1970) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's decision in Foremost-McKesson may
determine whether the deleted language should be returned to the statute, Provident Sec.
Inv. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 1117 (1975).
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exchange of a security for value that is voluntary or subject to the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse of inside information.
(5) For purposes of this subsection only, the term "profit" means
the excess of the highest sales price over the lowest purchase price on
the day each transaction accrues, and, in the discretion of the court, in-
terest and dividends.
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